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In this paper, we present a semi-loss-tolerant strong quantum coin-flipping (QCF) protocol with
the best bias of 0.3536. Our manuscript applies Quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement to
quantum coin-flipping protocol. Furthermore, a single photon as a single qubit is used to avoid the
difficult implementation of EPR resources. We also analyze the security of our protocol obtaining
the best result among all coin-flipping protocols considering loss. A semi-loss-tolerant Quantum
Dice Rolling (QDR) protocol is first proposed, and the security of corresponding three-party QDR
is analyzed to better demonstrate the security of our QCF.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Coin Flipping (QCF) is a cryptographic task
first introduced by Blum in 1981[1]. The goal of QCF is
to allow two parties (often referred as Alice and Bob)
who are distrustful and spatially separated to generate a
random bit. While the value of this random bit cannot be
controlled by anyone of them. The generalization of coin
flipping is dice rolling (DR), which was extensively intro-
duced in 1999 by Feige U[2] in classical settings. It is a
cryptographic problem originally proposed by N Aharon
and J Silman[3], describing N remote distrustful parties
must decide on a random string between 0 and N − 1.
There are two variants of QCF: “strong” CF (SCF)[4–
8] and “weak” CF (WCF)[9–11]. In SCF neither party
is aware of the other’s preference for the coin’s outcome,
while in WCF the parties have opposite and known pref-
erences. Obviously, every strong CF protocol can also be
used to implement a weak CF protocol, but the converse
statement is generally not true. The security of a CF pro-
tocol is quantified by the biases ǫ
(i)
A and ǫ
(i)
B (i ∈ {0, 1});
if P
(i)∗
A and P
(i)∗
B are the maximal probabilities that a
dishonest Alice or Bob can force the outcome to i, then
ǫ
(i)
j = P
(i)∗
j − 1/2, i ∈ 0, 1, j = A,B. (1)
In classical settings, a dishonest party who is given
unlimited computational power, can always fully bias the
outcome as he or she wants, i.e., ǫ = 1/2[12]. In contrast,
this is not the case in the quantum world: Unconditional
secure coin flipping is possible. Although Mayers[13] and
Lo Chau[14]’s results implied perfect quantum coin flip-
ping (the possibilities of both 0 and 1 are 1/2 no matter
what strategies a cheater uses) is impossible, it can be
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guaranteed that neither of the two parties can totally con-
trol the outcome (which is impossible by classical means).
The first strong coin flipping protocol was proposed by
Aharanov et al.[4] with a bias of 0.414. Subsequently
Ambainis[5], as well as Spekkens and Rudolph[6] inde-
pendently improved this bound to 0.25. Unfortunately it
was proven by Kitaev[15] that no quantum strong coin
flipping protocols can enjoy a bias less than 0.207 and
this bound has been saturated by Chailloux and Kereni-
dis’s protocol[8]. Compared with quantum SCF, quan-
tum WCF is less well studied, Spekkens and Rudolph[10]
first introduced a family of protocols with a bias of 0.207
and Mochon then improved it to 0.192 and finally to any
ǫ ≥ 0[11].
Although a lot of progress has been made along the
way of exploring the least bias protocols, there is a com-
mon limit of previous results: practical issues were not
taken into consideration. On imperfect practical condi-
tions -such as losses and noise in the quantum channel as
well as in the quantum memory storage- many protocols
will be totally failed. Losses were first analyzed during
the most common practical imperfection in the long dis-
tance communication. In 2008, Berl´ın et al [16] (see also
Ref.[17]) implied a loss-tolerant SCF protocol with a bias
of 0.4. The meaning of “loss-tolerant” here is defined
by [16] when the protocol is impervious to any type of
losses. After that Aharon et al.[18] announced a family
of loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping protocols achiev-
ing a smaller bias than Berl´ın et al. Very recently, Andre
Chailloux[19] added an encryption step to Berl´ın et al ’s
protocol and introduced an improved loss-tolerant quan-
tum coin flipping with bias 0.359. This result was slightly
improved by Ma et al [20] to 0.3536 with a semi-loss-
tolerant strong coin-flipping protocol using EPR pairs.
The meaning of “semi-loss-tolerant” here is explained by
[20] when the protocol isn’t impervious to certain types
of losses and its security varies with the degree of those
types of losses.
Compared with all the pratical SCF considering loss
2mentioned above, our protocol presented here obtains the
best bias of 0.3536. Our manuscript applies Quantum
non-demolition (QND) measurement to quantum coin-
flipping protocol. Furthermore, we make use of the single
photon as a single qubit avoiding the difficult implemen-
tation of EPR resources. After detailed security analysis,
we find the security of both our protocol and three-party
dice rolling protocol constructed by our protocol achieve
the best result among all coin-flipping protocols consid-
ering loss.
After this introduction, the structure of the paper is or-
ganized as follows. We begin our protocol in Sec. 2 with a
contrast to the protocol in [20]. In Sec. 3, We analyze the
security of our protocol and better demonstrate it using
an impressive three-party DR protocol, from which N-
party DR protocol will also be of best bias. Conclusions
and open problems are presented in Sec. 4.
II. QND-BASED SEMI-LOSS-TOLERANT
COIN-FLIPPING PROTOCOL
Recently the least bias among all SCF protocols con-
sidering loss is 0.3536 in [20]. And this protocol utilizes
EPR pairs to make it come true. Whereas, quantum en-
tanglement, as a physical resource, is of great difficulty
to prepare in practice. Considering this, we try to give a
more practical way to achieve the best result by utilizing
single photon instead of EPR pairs. Correspondingly we
change the protocol steps using Quantum nondemolition
(QND) measurements[21]. Here is our protocol.
1. We say of |ϕ(a, rA)〉 that a is the basis and rA is the
bit which could be showed as follows.
a = 0
{
|ϕ(0,0)〉 = |0〉
|ϕ(0,1)〉 = |1〉
, a = 1
{
|ϕ(1,0)〉 = cosα|0〉+ sinα|1〉
|ϕ(1,1)〉 = sinα|0〉 − cosα|1〉
.
Alice prepares one state |ϕ(a,rA)〉 from
|ϕ(0,0)〉 = |0〉, |ϕ(0,1)〉 = |1〉, |ϕ(1,0)〉 = cosα|0〉 +
sinα|1〉, |ϕ(1,1)〉 = sinα|0〉 − cosα|1〉(0 ≤ α ≤ π/2)
with basis a(0, 1) and bit rA(0, 1) chosen indepen-
dently at random, then she sends the single photon
to Bob.
2. Bob makes sure that he received this photon using
QND measurements, keeps the received qubit in his
quantum memory storage, and notices Alice about it.
Otherwise, he will restart the protocol.
3. Bob sends Alice a randomly selected classical bit b.
4. Alice informs Bob of her selected single photon
|ϕ(a,rA)〉.
5. Bob measures the qubit in the quantum memory ac-
cording to Alice’s announcing a. If he detects it, whose
outcome is denoted as rB, and finds that rA 6= rB , he
aborts the protocol, calling Alice a cheater. If rA = rB
or even he doesn’t detect the qubit due to the proba-
bility p(0 ≤ p ≤ 1) that the qubit in Bob’s quantum
memory storage is lost, the outcome of the coin flip-
ping is b⊕ rA.
In step 1, we just make use of a single photon instead
of EPR pairs. Because of the QND measurement in step
2, Bob can justify whether the single photon arrives or
not. Combining those two implements, we make it more
feasible to realize the protocol with current technology.
The key difference between the protocol in [20] and
ours is how to choose a method to better solve the prob-
lem that the qubit-receiver (Bob in our protocol) may
receive no qubit so that the qubit-sender (Alice in our
protocol) can announce any result to get the result she
wants. The protocol in [20] chooses to utilize EPR pairs
and our intention is to make it more practical by using
one single photon with QND measurement. The remain-
ing steps of the two protocols are equivalent.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Let’s begin with a comparison of security between
three protocols: Ma et al ’s protocol[20], Berl´ın et al ’s
protocol[16] and ours. On one hand, we analyze the dif-
ferences between the maximum bias of Alice, ǫA. In Ma et
al ’s protocol, ǫ
(M)
A = (1−p)· sinα2 +p·1/2, sinα2 is the prob-
ability that Alice’s maximum bias when Bob successfully
detect his particle with 1−p and this probability becomes
1/2 (That is to say, Alice can always bias the result to
what she wants with probability 1/2 + 1/2 = 1)when
Bob doesn’t detect his particle in his quantum mem-
ory storage with p. Similarly, in Berl´ın et al ’s protocol,
ǫ
(B)
A = 1/2 · sinα2 + 1/2 · 1/2 (The original text utilizes
1+2α′β′
4 where α
′ in the original text is cos α2 here, and
β′ is sin α2 here, that is to say,
1+2α′β′
4 =
1+2 cos α
2
sin α
2
4
= 1/2 · sinα2 + 1/2 · 1/2), in which sinα2 is the probabil-
ity that Bob’s measurement bases are the same as what
Alice reveals and this probability turns to be 1/2 when
their measurement bases are not the same. The differ-
ence between ǫ
(M)
A and ǫ
(B)
A is because Ma et al ’s protocol
manages to keep the two parties’ bases consistent to de-
crease the bias of Alice.
When coming to ǫ
(Y )
A of our protocol, we always assume
Bob is honest but Alice isn’t. The only difference between
Berl´ın et al ’s protocol and ours is that, we delay the
second step in Berl´ın et al ’s protocol and let Bob measure
his particle after Alice’s announcement of measurement
bases to keep the two parties’ bases consistent just as
what Ma et al have done in their protocol. Then how
could we guarantee the particle’s arrival in the second
step of Berl´ın et al ’s protocol, you may wonder? We
utilize the QND measurement to make it come true. This
is only related to Bob’s action, so ǫ
(Y )
A isn’t affected, that
is, our result is the same as Ma et al ’s protocol: the
maximum bias is sinα2 if Bob successfully detect the single
3photon; it becomes 1/2 if Bob doesn’t. As a result,
ǫ
(Y )
A = ǫ
(M)
A = (1 − p) ·
sinα
2
+ p · 1/2. (2)
On the other hand, let’s think about the difference be-
tween the maximum bias of Bob ǫB. ǫ
(M)
B = ǫ
(B)
B =
cosα
2 ,
which demonstrates that Ma et al ’s protocol doesn’t de-
crease the maximum bias of Bob. Similarly, the only
cheating strategy of Bob in our protocol is the same as
that of Bob in Berl´ın et al ’s protocol, that is, Bob uses
an optimal measurement bases to measure and guess the
single photon from Alice, then announcing a proper b to
get b⊕ rA which he wants. Thus,
ǫ
(Y )
B = ǫ
(M)
B = ǫ
(B)
B =
cosα
2
. (3)
Consequently we get our ǫ
(Y )
A = (1− p) · sinα2 + p · 1/2
and ǫ
(Y )
B =
cosα
2 which is the same as those in Ma et al ’s
protocol. The result is, both Alice and Bob, have an opti-
mal cheating strategy capable of producing their desired
outcome with 0.8536 probability of success (assuming the
other player is honest).
Note that quantum coin-flipping protocol can be used
to construct quantum dice rolling protocol. To better
show the security of our protocol, we will analyze the
security of three-party loss-tolerant dice rolling protocol
constructed by our coin flipping protocol. Three-party
semi-loss-tolerant dice rolling protocol is given as follows:
The first round Alice and Bob roll the dice accord-
ing to QND-BASED SEMI-LOSS-TOLERANT COIN-
FLIPPING PROTOCOL described above. In the final
step, if Bob detects the qubit, whose outcome is denoted
as rB, and finds that rA 6= rB, he aborts the protocol,
calling Alice a cheater. If rA = rB or even he doesn’t de-
tect the qubit, the outcome of the coin flipping is b⊕ rA.
Here we can suppose that Alice will win the first round
if b⊕ rA is 0, and Bob will win the first round if b⊕ rA is
1. The winner is supposed to be Alice and without losing
the generality will join the next competition.
The second round Alice and Charlie roll the
dice based on QND-BASED SEMI-LOSS-TOLERANT
COIN-FLIPPING PROTOCOL described above. If
Charlie detects it, whose outcome is denoted as rC , and
finds that rA 6= rC , he aborts the protocol, calling Alice
a cheater. If rA = rC or even he doesn’t detect the qubit,
the outcome of the coin flipping is c ⊕ rA. Here we can
suppose that Alice will win the second round if c⊕ rA is
0, and Charlie will win the second round if c ⊕ rA is 1.
The winner is the final winner of the three parties.
According to the definition in [3], DR protocol is fair
if and only if
P ∗A = P
∗
B = P
∗
C , (4)
with P ∗A(P
∗
B, P
∗
C)is the maximum probability that party
A (B, C) loses. And we analyze the following context
based on the maximum probability of loss.
What’s more, we will be interested in the N “worst
case” scenarios to maximize the bias, where all but one
of the parties are dishonest and moreover, are cooperat-
ing with one another, using the classical and quantum
communication channels.
First, let’s consider the maximum probability that
party Alice loses, P ∗A. According to the idea of N “worst
case”, we assume Bob and Charlie are dishonest and co-
operating with each other while Alice is honest. So Alice
will lose the first round with the probability of 1+cosα2 .
Otherwise, if she wins the first round, she will lose the
second found with the probability of (1− 1+cosα2 ) · 1+cos β2
due to Charlie’s maximum bias cosβ2 in this round. As a
result, the maximum probability that Alice loses is
P ∗A =
1+ cosα
2
+ (1 − 1 + cosα
2
) · 1 + cosβ
2
(5)
where 0 ≤ α, β ≤ π/2 exist in the basis of each stage.
In the same way, we get the maximum probability that
Bob loses
P ∗B =
1 + p+ (1− p) sinα
2
+[1− 1 + p+ (1− p) sinα
2
] · 1 + cosβ
2
,
(6)
and the maximum probability that Charlie loses is
P ∗C =
1 + p+ (1 − p) sinβ
2
. (7)
On the whole, this protocol is fair iff (4). Solve those
equations (4)(5)(6)(7) we get
α = arcsin
−p(1− p) +√2− 2p
2− 2p+ p2 . (8)
[
16
(1− cosα)2 +
4
(1 − p)2 ]P
∗
C
2
− [ 4(1 + p)
(1− p)2 +
16
1− cosα (
1 + cosα
1 − cosα +
1
2
)]P ∗C
+ 4(
1 + cosα
1− cosα +
1
2
)2 + (
1 + p
1− p )
2 − 1 = 0
(9)
β = arcsin
2P ∗C − 1− p
1− p . (10)
As a result, we can obtain the maximal fair bias of our
protocol ǫ(p) = P ∗A − 23 = P ∗B − 23 = P ∗C − 23 (a function
of p(0 ≤ p ≤ 1)) which is showed in FIG.1. We can see it
clearly in Curve Simulation(FIG. 1), ǫ(p) monotonously
decreases as p decreases. When p approaches 0, the max-
imal fair bias of our protocol ǫ(p) is 0.2899 and the max-
imum probability that party Alice (Bob or Charlie) loses
becomes 0.2899+0.6667=0.9566 which has also been the
best result up to now in terms of QDR considering loss.
Obviously, we can find that N-party QDR constructed
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FIG. 1: Maximal fair bias ǫ(p) is a function of p, it decreases
with decreasing p, and our optimal bias achieves the best
result.
by our protocol will be also of best bias. A compact six-
round weak three-sided DR protocol is constructed in [3]
using three-round weak imbalanced CF protocol in each
two stages. However, it cannot be loss-tolerant. Our pro-
tocol could be more practical and at the same time, more
secure with a lower bias.
IV. CONCLUSION
To sum up, we get a semi-loss-tolerant strong quan-
tum coin-flipping protocol using quantum non-demolition
(QND) measurement, and the innovation points in our
paper can be summarized as follows:
1. We utilize single photon to avoid the difficult imple-
ment of EPR resources, making our protocol more fea-
sible in practice.
2. We offer a new method to solve the problem that the
qubit-receiver (Bob in our protocol) may receive no
qubit so that the qubit-sender (Alice in our protocol)
could announce any result to get the result she wants
by combining QND measurement and the usage of sin-
gle photon.
3. In terms of bias, the most important indicator of QCF,
we obtain the best one of 0.3536 over all the QCF
considering loss.
4. Quantum coin-flipping protocol can be used to con-
struct quantum dice rolling protocol. To better an-
alyze the security of our QCF, our manuscript first
propose a semi-loss-tolerant QDR, and analyze the
security of corresponding three-party QDR. When
p approaches 0, the maximal fair bias of our pro-
tocol ǫ(p) is 0.2899 and the maximum probability
that party Alice (Bob and Charlie) loses becomes
0.2899+0.6667=0.9566 which has also been the best
result up to now in terms of QDR considering loss.
At the same time, a problem may emerge in the prac-
tical implementation because our bias is a function of
parameter p which is claimed by Bob. This is also demon-
strated in[20]. At the same time, it is necessarily impor-
tant that we continue to find a safer loss-tolerant quan-
tum coin-flipping protocol with a smaller bias.
Acknowledgments
This work is supported by NSFC (Grant Nos.
61300181, 61272057, 61202434, 61170270, 61100203,
61121061), Beijing Natural Science Foundation (Grant
No. 4122054), Beijing Higher Education Young Elite
Teacher Project (Grant Nos. YETP0475, YETP0477).
It is also supported by the National Basic Research Pro-
gram of China Grant 2011CBA00300, 2011CBA00302,
the National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant
61073174, 61033001, 61361136003.
[1] M. Blum, in Advances in Cryptology: A Report on
CRYPTO ’81(Santa-Barbara, CA, 1981), p. 11.
[2] Feige U, 1999 Proc. 40th Annual IEEE Symp. on the
Foundations of Computer Science (Los Alamitos, CA:
IEEE Computer Society Press) p 142.
[3] N Aharon and J Silman, 2010 New J. Phys. 12 033027.
[4] D. Aharonov, A. Ta-Shma, U. Vazirani, and A. C.
Yao (2000), Quantum Bit Escrow, Proceedings of the
32nd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing (New
York), pp. 705.
[5] A. Ambainis (2001), A new protocol and lower bounds for
quantum coin-flipping, Proceedings of the 33rd Annual
Symposium on Theory of Computing (New York), pp.
134.
[6] R.W. Spekkens and T. Rudolph (2001), Degrees of con-
cealment and bindingness in quantum bit commitment
protocols, Phys. Rev. A, Vol. 65, pp. 012310.
[7] Roger Colbeck (2007), An Entanglement-Based Protocol
For Strong Coin Tossing With Bias 1/4, Phys. Lett. A,
Vol. 362, pp. 390-392.
[8] A. Chailloux and I. Kerenidis (2009), Optimal quan-
tum strong coin-flipping, Proceedings of the 50th Annual
IEEE Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Sci-
ence (Atlanta, GA), pp. 527.
[9] C. Mochon (2004), Quantum weak coin-flipping with bias
of 0.192, quant-ph/0403193.
[10] R. W. Spekkens and T. Rudolph (2002), Quantum Proto-
col for Cheat-Sensitive Weak Coin Flipping, Phys. Rev.
Lett., Vol. 89, pp. 227901.
[11] C. Mochon (2007), Quantum weak coin-flipping with ar-
bitrarily small bias, quant-ph/0711.4114.
[12] J. Kilian, in Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Sym-
5posium on Theory of Computing (ACM Press, New York,
1988), p. 20.
[13] Dominic Mayers (1997), Unconditionally secure quantum
bit commitment is impossible, Phys. Rev. Lett., Vol. 78,
pp. 3414-3417.
[14] Hoi-Kwong Lo and H. F. Chau (1997), Is quantum bit
commitment really possible?, Phys. Rev. Lett., Vol. 78,
pp. 3410-3413.
[15] A. Kitaev (unpublished). The proof is reproduced in Ref.
[14].
[16] G. Berl´ın, G. Brassard, F. Bussie´res, and N. Godbout
(2009), Fair loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping, Phys.
Rev. A, Vol. 80, pp. 062321.
[17] A. T. Nguyen, J. Frison, K. Phan Huy, and S. Massar
(2008), Experimental quantum tossing of a single coin,
New J. Phys., Vol. 10, pp. 083037.
[18] N. Aharon, S. Massar, and J. Silman (2010), A family of
loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping protocols, Phys. Rev.
A, Vol. 82, pp. 052307.
[19] A. Chailloux (2011), Improved Loss-Tolerant Quantum
Coin Flipping, quant-ph/1009.0044.
[20] Jia-Jun Ma, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Qian Yang, Yan-Bing Li,
Qiao-Yan Wen, Quantum Inf. Comput. 12 pp.0489-0500
(2012).
[21] V. B. Braginsky and F. Ya. Khalili, Quantum nondemoli-
tion measurements: the route from toys to tools, Reviews
of Modern Physics, Vol. 68, No. 1, January 1996.
